Taliban in this modern day and age have become a phenomenon, which threaten the peace and livelihood of many individuals. The current impasse in Pakistan and the border regions of Afghanistan have left many developed nations with a fierce threat to their varied interests in the region. These self-proclaimed ‘students’ of Islam have demonized the religion by carrying out heinous acts and perpetrating terror amongst the local population. The Taliban of the current global structure are the illegitimate offshoot of the original ‘mujahedeen’ warriors, picked out from the region through Arab funding and indoctrinated with fundamentalist ideals with American help through the Pakistani border during the 80’s, in order to wage what was a much touted holy war against the then Soviet Union. Their religious legitimacy finds itself under question today merely because they are rebels without a cause that is supported by any major global power, since in actuality the religion of blood and martyrdom that they learnt so well when it was fed to them through propaganda was never an accurate representation of Islam.
It is the view of most moderate followers of Islam and indeed other organized religion that these Taliban dilute the actual aim of Islam, of which they have become self professed protagonists. The vulgarization of fundamental puritanical Islam, mixed with native and ethnic pre-modern values has gained them recognition amongst their stronghold of primitive tribal domains on both sides of the Durand line. However, the cost of such an adventure has had an adverse effect on the majority of the Muslim world, populated by human beings as rational as anywhere else on the planet, and has given rise to questions on various subjects and issues of Islam. Their promulgation of an Islamic order in these harsh anti-Islamic times has been heavily criticized in the Islamic scholarly world (Donovan, 2008); in no small part due to its similarities to tribal customs and its inaccuracies when compared to religion.
The vast majority of clerics, devoted to moderation, cite that the duties of a good Muslim are to adhere to Islamic practices and refrain from vices. And in Islam, just as all other recognized religion, it is a must to respect the sanctity of human life. Under such duties, unless there is an evident threat to Islam, the individual must act in a non-confrontational manner. The Taliban’s have detracted from the code of ethics prevalent in the region and have created an aggressive stance. The entire northern region of Pakistan along with several areas of Afghanistan have been held hostage at the behest of these self-proclaimed ‘students of Islam’, overriding centuries of Islamic intellectual legacy.
For the discussion on the theological beliefs of the Taliban to move forward, this essay will divulge into a deeper aspect of Islam, which would allow us to understand different forms of Islamic jurisprudence. Theology is the discipline reflecting on the body of doctrinal knowledge. This field endeavors to expand and construct on the various loopholes present in the society, in line with the religious edifice i.e. the Quran and the Hadith. Doctrinal knowledge is not infallible or eternal; therefore it is imperative to keep religious knowledge and religion separate. In contemporary fundamentalism, the segregation between the former and the latter has eroded, making the interpretation of religion as religion in itself (Albertini, 2003, p456). Jurisprudence forms an important part in the development of Islamic society. The questions of principles with their applications in accordance to the needs, is achieved through this method. Therefore, jurists are given the responsibility to make the ‘fiqh’ (jurisprudence) coherent with the ‘shariah’ (law).
The Sunni branch of Islam has four main schools of jurisprudence, where most of the literary knowledge is acquired. The earliest and perhaps the most progressive school is that of Imam Abu Hanifa, and this branch advocates qiyas (analogy) and istihan (juristic preference). A classic example could be the protection of mothers of illegitimate children from stoning until the period of gestation is fulfilled. The concept known as the ‘sleeping fetus’, interprets the Quranic punishment through qiyas, maintaining the sanctity of human life. The room for development of law within the Hanafi School expects its members to emulate the founder’s methodology, and not simply to regurgitate his decisions in verbatim (Albertini, 2003,p459).
The second school of jurisprudence is based upon the ideas of Imam Malik ibn Anas that emerged in protest to the excessive use of qiyas in the Hanafi School. Originally, the Maliki School consented to a blind adherence of Islamic practice as it was in Medina during the time of the prophet. This changed over time to produce more innovative sources. The notions of maslaha mursala (legitimate public interest) and istihab (presumption of continuity) were established in order to ensure innovation did not break with scriptural and legal ordinances. Maliki School of jurisprudence is commonly found in northern Africa, Sudan, Bahrain and Kuwait. It has been seen as being women friendly as it has many practices, which conform to a more modern lifestyle. For example the case of ‘khul’ permits the women to file for divorce without the consent of her husband, provided the correct evidence and material is presented. They have acquired the ‘sleeping fetus’ dictum and have further relaxed themselves from the founder’s stance.
The third school was formed under Imam Ibn Hanbal and is rather conservative. Followers of this particular branch resort to strict adherence of the Quran and the Hadith and permit analogy only after the inability to resolve the dispute through scripts and tradition. Their dominance is in present day Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Oman and this school has been influential through the backing of their respective states, amongst Middle Eastern scholarly circles (Albertini, 2003,p460).
The last prominent school in modern Islamic discourse was formed under Imam Ibn Idris Al-Shafi, and draws heavy inspiration in Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, East Africa, Indonesia and Malaysia. They stand in between the Hanifis and the Malikis, with regards to their stance on religion. They generally reject juristic preference, but endorse analogy as long as it is derived from the primary source, and also insist on analogy being on illa (effective cause) that is clearly established in the Holy Scriptures. They also allow departure from previous precedents, similar to Hanafi’s, if the jurist has reached a better verdict in preserving the fundamentals. These schools though differ in their views and opinion, but do not form a confrontational scenario amongst each other; rather they compliment the adab al-ikhtilaf (ethics of disagreement) (Albertini, 2003,p461).
In modern day, a fifth strand of source of inspiration and guidance can be outlined, though it lacks textual background and scholarly material, it has become popular since the eighteenth century. Formed under the leadership of Ibn Abd Al-Wahab in the Arabian Peninsula, it rejected the practice of taqlid (emulation) and moved away from following any of the schools of jurisprudence. Interesting to note is that Ibn Abd Al-Wahab was raised and taught as a Hanbali, however, his beliefs began to diverge from that particular line of jurisprudence. If a parallel were to be drawn, the closest school to the Wahabi ideology would be Hanbali, as both advocate the strictest interpretation of Islam. In wahabism, none of the legal means developed by classical jurisprudence are accepted. Thus this implies a direct application of the Quran and Hadith, without any importance paid to historic precedents and limitations on the applicability of primary sources of law in individual cases; rendering the difference between sharia and fiqh obsolete (Albertini, 2003,p461).
The code of conduct in Islam divides clearly into five separate categories: fard (obligatory), mustahabb or mandub (not obligatory but recommended), mubah (neutral or permitted), makruh (not forbidden but discouraged), and haram (forbidden). Moreover, the Hanafi School distinguishes further by declaring fard and wajib, whereas the latter is near obligatory in duty but not divinely ordained. Similarly, Islam orders not all obligations to be fulfilled collectively, for example, carrying out jihad when not required is fard al-kifaya (an obligation satisfied in the name of all by being assumed by some) not fard al-ayn (essential obligation). The fifth category of conduct ‘haram’, even though being the strictest, has been open to scrutiny when decisions are taken regarding the chastisement of a Muslim if his or her ritual obligations are not being fulfilled. The earlier example of ‘sleeping fetus’ denotes this where the hanafi and the Mailki School have extended the period of gestation under the shelter of humanity and prevention of loss of human life. On the contrary, in Saudi Arabia and in Taliban era of Afghanistan the moral police publicly flogged men who are found outside the mosque during prayer times (Albertini, 2003,p462).
The paper revolves around the theological beliefs of the Taliban government of Afghanistan during 90’s; therefore, an understanding of the pre-1996 Afghan society needs to be understood. The country is perhaps the first to gain independence in the South Asian region in the year 1919. Established as a kingdom, it stood at the crossroads of cultures between south and central Asia. Since centuries the region and adjoining areas have produced scholars and authorities of Islam, who travelled to many countries spreading and promoting the religion. In 1896 a prominent ruler of Afghanistan, Amir Abdul Rahman was given the title of ‘Ziya Ul Millat wa ad-Din’ (the light of the nation and of religion). This Afghan ruler contributed significantly towards the consolidation of traditional religious establishments and brought them under state supervision (Magnus & Naby, 1998,p70). He had tried on many occasions to convert Shia Muslims to Sunni Islam, which resulted in either migration or marginalization of the Shia population. The Afghan society is predominantly Sunni and follows the Hanafi School of jurisprudence. Till about 1977 the dominance of this school of thought was included in every constitution drafted in Afghanistan. This on a social level also acted as a binding force for the Afghans to look east towards their Muslim brethrens who followed the same lineage of jurisprudence (Magnus & Naby, 1998,p71).
Afghanistan was mostly a rural and an agrarian society till the time of the Soviet invasion. Since the majority of the population was in villages, their access to religion has been through the word of the local Imam or Mullah. The makeshift mosques served as the only hub of religious and indeed educational discourse, and the Friday prayers and the sermons that preceded them became the most influential tools in the lives of the local Afghans. The local Imams had primarily been the only source of religion, which undermined the greatness of the religion, as most of them were equipped with a very basic set of knowledge. This has traditionally gained the village Mullahs a lot of respect within their society and has played as an integral part in the politics of the country. As Afghanistan has pre-dominantly been a pasthun majority area, the pashtunwali (pashtun tribal code) has interfered and overlapped with all customs and practices of the country. It has been seen as an integral part in aiding the religion in areas of dispute. The code primary themes cover behavior and relations within the society, promoting a patriarchal and male chauvinistic approach. Themes such as melmastia and mehrmapalineh (concerning hospitality to guest), nanawati (right to asylum), badal (blood revenge), tureh (bravery), meranah (manhood), imandari (righteousness), ghayrat (defense of property and honor), and namus (defense of the honor of women) have ruled over the hearts and minds of tribal pashtuns (Goodson, 2001,p416).
Since there were no Madrasa of well repute in Afghanistan, motivated and determined scholars would travel to Bokhara or India to gain a quality education. This brought about the introduction of the Deobandi School into the Afghan society. The madrasa at Deoband quickly flourished due to its strict adherence to Hanafi Interpretation and new educational methods (Magnus & Naby, 1998,p76). Early Afghan scholars could spend about ten to twelve years at the Deoband covering a vast syllabus of Islam, which included the Hanafi fiqh, Arab and Persian literature along with Greek and Arab philosophy. Deoband amongst many other unique characteristics maintained a strict adherence to orthodoxy and rejected bid’at (additions to religion). It also distanced itself from the cult of saints; however, it incorporated the Sufi order especially of the naqshbandi and qadiri lineage (Roy, 1990,p57). This resonated with traditonal Afghani islamic practices as such orders were common over there. Similarly during the struggle for independance in India agasint the British Raj, Deoband prepared a very islamic framework to defend the fall of the Ottoman Calihpate. This drive was also echoed in Afghanistan by the initiative to carry out anti British operations in the frontier regions of Afghanistan. Whilst its primary goal of protection of the Caliphate turned into a rather futile exercise as the Turks decided to rid themselves of it, the drive resulted in the creation of many deobandi madrasas along the current Pak-afghan border developing students to defend and resist british imperialism. The deoband school of religious studies, propogated a pan islamic sub-continent and was against the creation of Pakistan. This idea reflected their vision to envisage a mulsim hegemony in the entire region, therefore, the idea of nationalism was more of a Salafi tradtion, and limiting the scope of islam within a country was discouraged by the school (Roy, 1990,p58). The above mentioned point, will perhaps be an important factor in distiguishing the propogations of the Taliban beliefs.
In the twentieh century, the status qou of the Afghani society and politics was severely disprupted. In the 70’s the king faced a coup and was exiled from the land leaving administration in the hands of the his cousin and a western ally. Politcal turbulence continued till the 80’s when finally the Soviet Union entered Afghanistan and set the stage for the cold war. The American government with the help of the Pakistani administration and Saudi Arabian funding succesfully raised an army of various ethnicities, under the banner of Islam. The Pakistani administration provided the techinical know how and strategic cover to the mujahideen warriors along with manpower in the shape of madrasa students and even some paramilitary troops. The Saudis invested through heavy funding and exported radicals from their land into Afghanistan. Saudi arabia not only exported money but helped build a wahabi party in neighbouring Pakistan by the name of Itehad –e- islami, which spread the salafi version of Islam amongst the Afghan wariors thus transfering the wahabi movement onto another region. The resulted in tension amongst various ethnic Afghans, as the wahabi ideology was viewed as foreign, and it disregarded both sufi and local traditions, however, under the greater good of expelling non-muslims i.e. the Soviets out of Afghanistan this resentment died out (Rashid, Taliban: Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia, 2002, p83).
The war between Soviet Union and America through their Afghan proxies lasted for a decade, but its consequences lived on forever. After the Soviet withdrawal, western interest groups turned their back on the region, leaving the children i.e mujahideen, of war unchecked. With Afghanistan in shambles, the economy crippled and with other regional players influencing the upcoming political setup, the country fell back into civil war. The mujahideen warriors were constructed of roughly about eight ethnicities, and Sunni muslims were in majority. After the soviet retreat, each ethnic group held their locations in order to secure it and, fought the other side at any oppurtunity. Unity was at the lowest, and religious zeal was converting into material gains and power politics. Pakistan being the most connected and affected neighbour groomed and backed the taliban to take over the capital Kabul, in order to have an army of its own creation serve its regional interest. The non pashtun fighters who had arrived during the mujhaideen war not only brought wahabi influence, but brought with themselves ample amounts of foreign exchange to fund the Taliban adventure. The Taliban emerged in mid-1994. The most commonly believed account of their origin is that the core of the movement was formed at the moment when a group of local religious leaders took up arms against a commander who had abducted and raped two women in Kandahar in July 2004 (Rashid 2002,p25). The institutional spine of the Taliban has always been the network of madrasas in Pakistan and to some extent in Afghanistan. The teachers, alumni and religious students from these madrasas, which also happened to be predominantly Pashtun formed part of the Taliban. The Sunni religious leadership is not knit into tight hierarchical organizations, but rather operate in loose networks based on personal loyalties. This is exactly why the ability of the Taliban movement, in the mid-1990s, to mobilize a relatively coherent army with one leadership bank, influential throughout most of Afghanistan’s Pashtun south, was so impressive. The Taliban based themselves from madrasas in the Deobandi tradition, aiming at a society based on the Koran and the Sunnah – the practice of the Prophet (Harpviken, 2006,p6).
The Taliban’s first programmatic declarations were based on wide reaching popular consultations, and can be summed up in three basic points: to re-establish peace, disarm the population, and conform to sharia-law, defending the Islamic heritage of Afghanistan. Importantly, the frame of reference for all these objectives was the Afghan state. There was no reference – explicit or implicit – to the global Islamic community of believers. The objectives seemed attractive to a large share of the Afghan population, although many had reservations both about the blending of Islam and politics and about the Pashtun dominance (Harpviken, 2006,p9). One could see many similarities between the Taliban and the Wahabi movement that had spawned them. Both mobilized muster force on the pretext of jihad, martyrdom and removal of un-Islamic governments in order to establish an Islamic state. Similarly, both insisted on the necessity of ijtihad (interpretation) as being the most vital and correct form in developing Islam. The extreme prohibition of music and celebrations advocated by Wahabism is clearly evident in the Taliban version of Islam. Moreover, the establishment of the department for promotion of virtue and prevention of vice reflected a mirror image of the Wahabi setup in Saudi Arabia (Marsden, 2002,p73).
The taliban’s endevour to remain committed on jihad, even though there primary school of thought does not stress on the urgency of jihad, is seen as merely politcal and ethnic. If the Taliban had fallen susceptible to the western pressure and had relaxed their views on governance and Afghanistan, then a rebellion amongst their file and ranks was expected. The armed forces of the Taliban were fighting for an islamic cause, however, the pasthunwali code was a determining factor as well. The massacre of mazar –e – sharif by the Taliban forces was a clear result of their ethnic priorities lying before their religious goals. It was renowned for the taliban to remove any non pashtun official from the government position and place a taliban commander, defying merit and equality. The inability of the taliban to form a legalised and legitmate government, refelected their distance from knowledge. It became more and more evident that this was a band of illiterate ruffians that had finally been allowed to run havoc, all under the unfortunate banner of a religion that found its reputation tainted by the very people that claimed to study it.
The ad hoc style of administration in the Taliban was not commanded by any school of thought, in fact classical jurisprudence stresses the need of good governance more than anything else, when running an islamic state. Their form of governance gave more weightage on estabilishing a state which in letter proclaims islam, however, no substantial mechanism or method of statecraft was devised. Most of the Talibans carried the title of a mullah, which was self conferred, and passed verdicts without consulations and religious backing. Mullah Omar, the commander of the Taliban government, self proclaimed himself to be Amir ul Momineen (ruler of the faithful) without having full islamic qualifications. The Taliban ruled the country without the presence of a constitution, therefore, they derived legitimacy, law and policy through verbal decrees of Mullah Omar. In a famous incident of a gross violation of human rights, one of their ministers was reported to have said that a ‘heavenly order was publicly administered on the culprit’ (Kleiner, 2000). Although parallels may be drawn with Mr Bush and his alleged conversations with God, that is a discussion reserved for another essay.
The native form of shariah has been part of Afghan culture since many centuries, aided with the pasthunwali style of administration. Local mullahs and qazis (judges) decided upon local issues and passed verdicts in light of whatever limited amounts of knowledge were available to them, religious or general. Due to the remoteness of most of the villages, this practice remained unchecked by the state and therefore culminated in a de facto religious hoop, where any beard spoke the truth and larger beards were right. The Taliban simply regurgigated this village practice onto the national level, without having sufficient religious discourse to elaborate on many of the issues. The taliban publicly lashed women for adultery or acts relating to adultery, amputated limbs of men found guilty of robbery, alleged murders were shot or hanged in town centres and their bodies left to decay as warnings to the public. The few mentioned above do not reflect either the deobandi or the hanafi or the wahabi prescribed methods of carrying out justice. At this point in time, it became painfully obvious that these rulers lacked the capacity to rule.
Moreover, these acts according to classic islamic jurisprudence can hold the incumbent ruler or government responsible and result in compulsory retribution. A loose link is usually traced to such punishments, as the Quran referes to certain forms of punishment for acts decalred haram. However, they vary from the above method, and the execution and delivery of justice is always derived from jurisprudence; which the Taliban government conveniently failed to acknowledge, under the cloak of self percieved puritanical Islam. The justice carried out in the country were through jirgas (local councils) and the criterion of a judge was based on tribal norms rather than religious background or merit. In spirit the jirgas placed pasthunwali values higher, and justfied their custom laced verdicts through literal quranic and Hadith translations picked out to suit particular scenarios. Taliban as understood now avoided the introduction of emulation, as it could have undermined their local practices. Although the majority of the fighters were briefly educated in deobandi madrasa’s, by the time they reached the streets to take control of the governance, their desire to adhere to islamic principles would take a back seat to their primary education, that of a warrior trained to die for glory.
The Talibans had unfortunately no notion of communal scholarly quest that has a free space of inquiry and remains by nature open ended, which is common practice in common madrasas. Even though the Taliban strictly conformed to traditions of early islam, they conveniently mixed their pasthunwali practice and diluted their puritanical message. Today one of the finest samples of ijtihad are produced in far eastern muslim countries, that are geographically remote from the birth place of Islam. Modern civil law of western derivations, combined with the principles of muslim jurisprudence, allow them to claim the right to incorporate their pre islamic customs. Drawing reflections back to how the arabs in the 6th and the 7th century were allowed to retain their customary practices that fell in line with islamic principles. To the fundamentalist and the Taliban, such practices were an outragous disrespect to islam’s legacy and there was no need or indeed allowance for adaptations or alterations. Their perception of law is uniformity and rigidness through the entire islamic world, remaining unchanged in all ages. The Taliban had little interest in the ethics of a muslim and their priority was declaring holy war as manditory for all, and that punishment should be carried out in a gruesome manner to prevent further moral decay. The Taliban sharia served as a daily reminder of the administrations rigid and uncompromising religious interpretation. The crafting and expansion of rules through qiyas was seen as a potential threat which could weaken their control over their uneducated force and fellow Afghans. At this point, the Orwellian Animal farm had come full circle, and fellow animals were being led to the slaughter to serve as examples to the populus of the farm.
In conclusion the Taliban ideology thrived due to classical jurisprudence being marginalised and basic puritanical actions provided short term relief to the war torn nation. The ideological doctrine that inspired the taliban government sadly does not exist, as they were unable to produce substantial material backing their method of governance. They were a prodigy of the Pakistani Inter services Intelligence at the behest of Saudi oil dipped dollars shipped to the illiterate tribes in US wrapping paper. This creation gone wrong became a safe haven for the Al-Qaeda, and their simplistic aims became more similar to dictatorial conquistidors rather than religious freedom fighters. On the platform of religion they commited acts that vulgarised islam and undermined the religion’s notion of tolerant and just governance. They were created out of Deobandi madrassa’s, exposed to Wahabism, funded by saudi arabia, and supported by the Pakistan. In the middle of the mix whilst it was about to set was dropped the elixir of the illiterate, and so powerful a catalyst it proved to be that today we find the very meaning of a religion held hostage by a band of people working like a mafia.
The Taliban today are openly notorious, hence their legacy no longer extends itself under the guise of religious defence. In Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Taliban are an open alternative to the state economy, one that allows for a unique fusion of chauvenistic gun touting along with the earning of a wage through loot and plunder that amounts to several times the income earnt by any lawful member of society. If any man joins the Taliban around the heights of the Khyber pass today, they do so under a very clear and simple understanding. Long gone are the ideas of religion and defence. Today, it is all about the notoriety that comes with being a real man, providing for your numerous wives by stealing from the pro American extablishment and owning a gun in the process. A Beard helps, because it is the way of the Pashtun, not because it is a symbol of Islam. If ever the world is rid of these students of illiteracy, every nation and religion shall breathe a sigh of relief, with Afghanistan and Islam sighing loudest of all.
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